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It may be stated without exaggeration that the London
Agreement'- and the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal2 which forms an integral part of this Agreement,
greatly transcend in scope and importance the immediate pur-
pose for which they were created. The Agreement was origin-
ally adopted for the trial of war criminals "whose offenses
have no particular geographical location ' 3 and, more specifi-
cally, "for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the
major war criminals of the European Axis". 4 It was solemnly
emphasized by the Allied Prosecution moreover, that the rules
created by the Charter must, in the future, apply equally to
nationals of .the victorious Powers. 5 Hence, it would seem that
the avowed main purpose of the trial (to restrain individuals
1 Nazi conspiracy and aggression, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel for the prose-
cution of Axis criminality, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946, 8
vols., vol. I, pp. 1-3.
2 Ibid., pp. 4-11.
3 Ibid., p. 1. -
4Ibid., Charter of the International Military Tribunal (hereinafter called "the
Charter"), Article 1, p. 4. The conception of a tribunal created for the punishment
of those over whom it is to sit in judgment may perhaps be considered as a regret-
table inaccuracy which, however, does not necessarily reflect upon the Tribunal's
impartiality.
5 For statements to this effect see for instance: Mr. Justice Jackson, "Summary
review of the Indictment and the Charter and their legal foundations", in The
Trial of German major war criminals, Proceedings of the International Military
Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (hereinafter called "'Proeeedings"),
H. M. Stationary Office, London, 1946, Part 1, p. 85, where it is said that "while
this law is first applied against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to
serve a useful purpose it must condemn, aggression by any other nations, including
those which sit here now in judgment . . . This trial represents mankind's desperate
effort to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen who have used their powers
of state to attack the foundations of the world's peace, and to commit aggressions
against the rights of their neighbors."
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by means of legal provisions from the perpetration of crimes
against peace) cannot be achieved by the prosecuting nations if
the rules have limited application.
After consultation with the Control Council for Germany,
pursuant to Article 1 of the London Agreement, the first-and
as it appears at present, the only-trial of the International
Military Tribunal, was conducted at Nuremberg, Germany. It
does not appear that official notice has been given to terminate
the existence of the International Military Tribunal, neverthe-
less at least de facto, it ceased to function when the parties to
the London Agreement decided to conduct further trials before
their respective municipal courts, and when the resignation of
the United States judges as well as the United States prosecu-
tors was accepted by President Truman.
The legal as well as the political aspects of the Nuremberg
Trial,7 are considered by the President of the International
Military Tribunal as "unique in the history of the jurisprud-
ence of the world" and of "supreme importance to millions of
people all over the globe". 8 They may well give leading impetus
to the development of new, revolutionary concepts, in compari-
son to existing rules of international law, which are likely to
affect deeply the relations among states.
The most controversial, and potentially most significant
phase of the trial, centers around Article 6, section a, of the
Charter, which imposes "individual responsibility" for acts
constituting "Crimes against Peace". The term "Crimes
against Peace" is defined by the Charter as "planning, prep-
aration, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances,
or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accom-
plishment of any of the foregoing."" Little doubt exists that
6 Proceedings, op. oit., p. 85, where it is stated: "I am too well aware of the
weakness of juridical action alone to contend that in itself your decision under this
Charter can prevent future wars. Judicial action always comes after the event. Wars
are started only on the theory and in the confidence that they can be won. Personal
punishment, to be suffered only in the event the war is lost, will probably not be a
sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the warmakers feel the chances of defeat
to be negligible. But the ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars .. .is to make
statesmen responsible to law."
7 Hereinafter called " I the Trial ".
8 Proceedings, op. cit., Part 1, p. 1.
9 The Indictment lodged against the defendants, in Berlin, on October 18, 1945,
gives detailed charges of the common plan or conspiracy in "Count One" which,
according to the Allied Prosecution, embraces the commission of Crimes against
Peace (Proceedings, Part 1, op. cit., pp. 2-11). It furnishes particulars concerning
these crimes in "Count Two" (Ibid.. pp. 11-21). The Tribunal, in its judgment,
considered it convenient to discuss both counts together "as they are in substance
the same" and since "the same evidence has been produced to support both counts."(Nazi conspiracy and aggression, op. cit., Opinion and Judgment, Washington, 1947
[hereinafter quoted as "Opinion and Judgment"], p. 5).
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"Crimes against Peace", as stated by the U. S. Prosecution,
constitute "the heart of the case", and that everything else in
the Nuremberg trial, however dramatic, however sordid, how-
ever shocking and revolting to the feelings of civilized peoples,
is only incidental, or subordinate to the supreme crime against
peace. It is certainly true that "War Crimes" in the restricted
and conventional sense of the term, as well as "Crimes against
Humanity", which are the other charges against the Nazi
defendants, "would have little juridical international signifi-
cance, except for the fact that they were the preparation for the
commission of aggressions against peaceful neighbouring
peoples."- 0 The crime of war may therefore be considered at
once the object and the parent of all the other crimes enumer-
ated in the Charter. The Tribunal accepted this viewpoint in
its judgment, by declaring that "to initiate a war of aggression,
therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme
international crime differing only from other war crimes in
that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the
whole. ""-
In support of the charges of "Crimes against Peace" the
Allied Prosecution submitted that the defendants planned and
initiated the chain of events leading to the Second World War,
by- seizing Austria and Czechoslovakia.12 The Tribunal ac-
cepted this evidence in its verdict by expressing the opinion
that "the invasion of Austria was a premeditated, aggressive
step in furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against
other countries"' 3 and that the Munich Agreement, by which
Czechoslovakia was forced to acquiesce in the cession of the
Sudetenland to Germany, was only a first step of aggression
preceding the- complete seizure of Czechoslovakia. 14
It would be absurd even to question the facts concerning the
seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia. A careful analysis of
the Nuremberg trial, as well as of its possible future implica-
tions, can hardly ignore the attitude of the prosecuting gov-
ernments toward the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovalda at
the time it was accomplished. The attitude underwent important
changes many months after the principal Allies had declared
war on Germany. It is, for example, well to remember, in this
context, that the prosecuting governments recognized the an-
nexation of Austria without delay. As far as the United States
10 Proceedings, op. cit., Part 1, p. 143.
11 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., p. 16.
12 Proceedings, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 211-264, Part 2, pp. 2-45 and pp. 87-125.
13 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., p. 21.
14 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., pp. 24-27.
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is concerned, this recognition is reflected in the closure of the
United States legation at Vienna, and the transfer of its diplo-
matic agenda to the United States Emb6assy at Berlin. It is
reflected, also, in the American acceptance of correlated steps
with regard to the Austrian legation in Washington, D. C.
This recognition was Consistently upheld as the public policy
of the country until 1942, even after the United States had been
forced to declare war on Germany. Federal Courts in natural-
ization proceedings, for instance, insisted that Austrians, even
though they emigrated to the United States before the Annexa-
tion, had the legal status of German nationals. The recognition
of Austria's seizure is exemplified also by the fact that the
restrictions enforced by the United States and British govern-
ments against enemy aliens applied equally to Austrian na-
tionals. Moreover, it is well known that a request of the Mexi-
can government demanding that the League of Nations, (of
which three of the prosecuting states were leading members),
enforce the obligations under the Covenant,15 was not acted
upon. As recently stated by a well known authority, these
facts "would seem to negative the holding by the Nuremberg
Tribunal that the planning and consummation of the annexation
constituted an international crime.' 6 One may not be ready to
interpret the passivity of the League of Nations, and the de
facto-if not de jure-recognition by the prosecuting govern-
ments of Austria's seizure by Germany as politically or legally
relevant. But even so, one is constrained to admit that a pos-
sible excuse with a fait accompli would hardly be acceptable
in the case of the ill famed Munich Agreement, concluded be-
tween Hitler and Mussolini on the one hand, and the British
and French Prime Ministers on the other; an agreement by
which Czechoslovakia was left no other alternative than to cede
to Germany what may, perhaps, be considered the economically
most important part of her territory. Hence, if the conception
is upheld that the seizure of Austria, and especially the acts of
aggression preceding the complete occupation of Czechoslo-
vakia, are crimes against peace, it would be consistent to con-
cede that all, or (as regards Czechoslovakia) that three of the
prosecuting governments participated in these criminal acts.
In the case of Poland, the International Military Tribunal held
that "the war initiated by Germany against Poland was most
15 G. A. Finch, Address delivered before the Section on International and Com-
parative Law of the American Bar Association at Atlantic City, New Jersey, October
29, 1946, p. 8.
16 Ibid. See also G. A. Finch, "The Nuremberg Trial and International Law,"
in The American Journal of International Law, vol 41 (January, 1947), pp. 20-37.
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plainly an aggressive war, which was to develop into a war which
embraced almost the whole world, and resulted in the commis-
sion of countless crimes, both against the laws and customs of
war, and against humanity.'1 7 The acceptance of this fact, it
will be interesting to observe, necessitates the conclusion that the
partition of Poland, agreed upon between the governments of
Germany and Soviet Russia, renders the latter a criminal par-
ticipant in the commission of the supreme crime against peace.
Nor should the somewhat embarassing implication be over-
looked that the U. S. Government "officially compromised with
international crimes and criminals. '1 8 It did so, first, by in-
voking the provisions of the Neutrality Act, not only in the case
of the invasion of Poland, but also with regard to other Euro-
pean countries subsequently attacked and occupied by Germany,
and by proclaiming at a much later date that these invasions
constituted international criminal acts.
Obviously, the purpose of these few examples 19 is not to imply
that leading nationals of the victorious countries should be tried
as war criminals, nor that the moral war guilt of Germany's
political leaders has not been established beyond any doubt
whatsoever. The examples are cited merely in order to demon-
strate, at the outset, the political and (as shall be shown in the
following) legal difficulties inherent in the novel conception of
"Crimes against Peace". Although no doubt exists that the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal must be con-
sidered as the law binding upon the prosecuting powers and the
judges, a supreme effort was made at Nuremberg to prove that
"Crimes against Peace" and individual criminal responsibility
for their commission was no legal innovation of the victorious
Powers, but constituted a valid rule of positive international law
existing before the creation of the International Military Tri-
bunal.20 This view was shared by the International Military
Tribunal which stated in its verdict, that "the law of the Charter
17 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit, p. 34.
18 G. A. Finch, op. cit., p. 9.
19 In the elaborate account of foreign relations leading to the events of 1939 Coun-
sel for the Defense cited many niore examples in proof of the compromising policies
pursued by all, or some, of the prosecuting Powers. Great importance, e. g., was
given the protocol attached to the German Soviet Pact (The Trial of German War
Criminals. . .Speeches of the Prosecution at the close of the case against the indi-
vidual defendants [hereinafter cited as "Closing Speeches"], p. 45). At the time
this essay was written the complete text of the Nuremberg Proceedings, including the
arguments of the Counsel for the Defense were not available to the writer.
20 See for instance Mr. Justice Jackson, in Proceedings, op. cit, Part I, p. 78:
"The validity of the provisions of the Charter is conclusive upon us all, whether we
have accepted the duty of judging or of prosecuting under it, as well as upon the
defendants who can point to no other law which gives them a right to be heard at all."2
The assertion that the London Agreement rendered all provisions of the Charter bind-
ing on the accused is highly questionable and will be dealt with later in this essay.
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is decisive, and binding upon the Tribunal. ... The Charter is
not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious
nations, but in the view of the Tribunal... it is the expression
of international law existing at the time of its creation; and to
that extent is itself a contribution to international law." 21 In
support of this theory the prosecution submitted that numerous
non-aggression treaties concluded before 1939, treaties to which-
Germany was a signatory, are conclusive proof of a generally
accepted international custom according to which a war of ag-
gression is a crime for the commission of which its perpetrators
may be held individually responsible. While admitting the diffi-
culty of defining the exact meaning of the term, "war of aggres-
sion", 22 it was stated that "the very minimum consequence of
the treaties making aggressive war illegal, is to strip those who
incite or wage it of every defence the law ever gave, and to leave
war-makers subject to judgment by the usually accepted prin-
ciples of the law of crimes. ' 2' It was maintained also by the
U. S. prosecution that illegal wars are acts of "piracy and bri-
gandage", and that "the principle of individual responsibility
for piracy and brigandage, long recognized as crimes punishable
under International Law, is old and well established."' 2 ' The
British prosecution tried to keep strictly within the legal aspects
of the problem by analyzing the merits of the various treaties
violated by Germany. It emphasized the view of the British
Government that "the Tribunal will apply to individuals, not
the law of the victor, but the accepted principles of international
usage . . .", and stated that "aggressive war had become, (in
virtue of the Pact of Paris and the other treaties and declara-
tions" submitted in evidence by the prosecution), "illegal and a
crime beyond all uncertainty and doubt." 25  These "self evi-
dent" findings of the prosecution, it appears, are primarily based
on the Pact of Paris which (according to popular notions) pro-
hibits war as an instrument of national policy without qualifica-
tion. Hence, it was not only proposed that recourse to war in
21 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., p. 48.
22 Mr. Justice Jackson, in Proceedings, op. cit., Part I, p. 81: "It is perhaps a
weakness in this Charter that it fails itself to define a war of aggression. Abstractly,
the subject is full of difficulty and all kinds of troublesome hypothetical cases can be
conjured up.'
23 Ibid., p. 81.
24 Ibid., p. 82. This comparison, it ought to be emphasized, is legally meaningless
since it is impossible to consider the waging of illegal war as falling within the scope
of the generally accepted definition of piracy juris gent um. The latter "in its orig-
inal and strict meaning, is every unauthorized act of violence committed by a private
vessel on the open sea against another vessel with intent to plunder." (Oppenheim,
International Law, vol. 1, §272).
25 Sir Hartley Shaweross, in Proceedings, op. cit., Part 2, p. 54.
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violation of this Pact is illegal, but that "there is no difference
between illegality and criminality in a breach of law of civilised
life.' '26 Refuting emphatically the arguments advanced by
counsel for the defence that international law does not attribute
criminality to states, and still less to individuals, the British
Chief Prosecutor exclaimed that the adherence to such an out-
dated theory would reduce international law to an absurdity.
Hence, the "inescapable conclusion" 2 7 drawn from the renuncia-
tion, prohibition, and condemnation of illegal war as expressed
in these treaties, and especially in the General Treaty for the
Renunciation of War concluded on August 27, 1928, is that the
prosecuting powers responsible for the Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal, "refuse to reduce justice to impo-
,tence by subscribing to the outworn doctrines that a sovereign
State can commit no crime and that no crime can be committed
on behalf of the sovereign State by individuals acting in its
behalf.... If this be an innovation, it is an innovation long over-
due-a desirable and beneficent innovation fully consistent with
justice, fully consistent with common sense and with the abiding
purposes of the Law of nations." 28 As may be noted from the
foregoing the British Prosecution did not hesitate to admit
that some provisions of the Charter might be considered as inno-
vations, or to quote directly, as "wise and far reaching" meas-
ures of "international legislation". Great care, nevertheless,
was taken to stress, time and again, the point that "International
law had already, before the Charter was adopted, constituted
aggressive war a criminal act.' '29 The Government of the Soviet
Socialist Republics, through the mouth of its Chief Prosecutor,
found it expedient to justify its case legally against the de-
fendants primarily with the assertion that "in the International
field the basic source of law and the only legislative act is a
treaty, an agreement between States." Since the London Agree-
ment is an international treaty, "signed by the four countries
which acted in the interests of all freedom-loving nations", it
was conjured that the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal "is to be considered an unquestionable and sufficient
legislative act, defining and determining the basis and the pro-
26 Sir Hartley Shaweross, in Closing Speeches, op. cit., p. 54.
27 Sir Hartley Shawcross, in Proceedings, op. cit., Part 2, p. 55.
28 Sir Hartley Shaweross, in Proceedings, op. cit., Part 2, p. 55. As far as the
Prosecution's appeal to "common sense" and "justice" is concerned it may be
well to remember that these concepts refer to moral and not to purely legal concepts.
They cannot be defined precisely.
29 Ibid., p. 56.
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cedure for the trial and punishment of major war criminals." '30
It is, perhaps, not quite precise to call a treaty a legislative
act, since the latter term presupposes the existence of a legis-
lative body, and since an international legislature as part of an
international government is non-existent. Apart from the use
of this terminological ambiguity, it would seem that the legal
value of the definition presented on behalf of the Soviet Gov-
ernment might have been enhanced by stating clearly that-
according to existing rules of international law-the London
Agreement and the Charter attached to it created rights and
obligations only with regard to its signatories. Nazi Germany
never consented to the London Agreement.$' On the basis of
the latter the International Military Tribunal, therefore, must
be considered as an inter-allied court.3 2 More serious attention,
however, should be given to the argument, put forward in sup-
port of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, according to which the
London Agreement and the Charter constitute, a legislative act
of the four prosecuting Powers binding upon Germany--at least
by later implementation. This opinion is based on the Potsdam
Declaration, according to which the whole legislative and execu-
tive power previously exercised by the legitimate German Gov-
ernment of Grand Admiral Doenitz has been taken over, without
any restriction, by the governments of the occupant States, i.e.,
the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Govern-
ment of the French Republic.38 Germany as an independent
State does not exist. It has been replaced by the joint sover-
eignty of the occupant powers which have established a Con-
dominium over the German territory and the German popula-
tion. This Condominium is exercised by the Control Council at
Berlin, composed of the Commanders in Chief of the Four
Powers. No doubt, therefore, exists that the whole legislative,
judicial and executive rights formerly possessed by the German
Government are vested in the Control Council. This means that
the four powers represented on the Control Council and the
original signatories of the London Agreement, establishing the
80 R. -A. Rudenko, Chief Prosecutor f6r the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
in The Trial of German major war criminals ... Opening Speeches, H. M. Stationery
Office, London, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as "Opening Speeches") p. 136. See
also Proceedings, op. cit., Part 6, p. 166.
31 The legal signifcanee of Control Council Law No. 10 which, retroactively, gives
effect to the London Agreement to the extent to which it is applicable to the German
territory is being discussed in the following.
32 For a detailed review see P. B. Schick, "War criminals and the law of the
United Nations", in Toronto Law Journal, January, 1947.
83 H. Kelsen, "IThe Legal Status of Germany According tQ the Declaration of
Berlin" in 39 American Journal of International Law (1945), p. 518.
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International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, are the same.
Therefore it would have been possible for the four powers, de-
sirous of prosecuting alleged German major. war criminals, to
create a compeient German court and to 'promulgate the law
to be applied by this court, by means of a legislative act of the
Berlin' Control Council. Such a procedure, however, was not
chosen. The. London Agreement by which the International
Militai'y Tribunal was established is an inter-allied treaty and
not a legislative act promulgated by the Control Council. In
this Agreement the Signatories declare expressly that they are
"acting in the interests of all the United Nations." Moreover,
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which forms
an integral part of this Agreement provides in Article 1, not
%only for the trial of Germans but of major war criminals of
all European Axis countries. Obviously, the Control Council
has legislative authority only with respect to the territory over
which, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, the occu-
pant Powers exercise their Condominium; it can certainly not
promulgate laws binding upon other European Axis countries
such as, for instance, Italy, which never ceased to have its own,
national government. It would seem inconsistent, therefore,
to maintain that the London Agreement is also, or implies, a
legislative act of the Control Council binding upon Germany.
The International Military Tribunal, in its judgment, expressed
the, same opinion, declaring that "the making of the Charter
was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the coun-
tries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered." 3'
It is not stated, one will observe, that the creation of the Charter
constitutes a legislative act of the Berlin Control Council. It
is true that the latter, by means of Control Council Proclama-
tion No. 1 and Control Council Law No. 1035, gave, with regard
to Germany, retroactive effect to the terms of the London Agree-
ment.and the Charter of the International .Military Tribunal;
but it did not establish either of them. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that Control Council Proclamation No. 1 and Control Coun-
cil Law No. 10 show the legally correct pattern by which a
34 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., p. 48.
35 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of persons guilty of war crimes, crimes
against peace and against humanity, in The Department of State Bulletin, vol. 15
(November 10, 1946), p. 862, where it is stated that: "In order to give effect to the
terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement of
8 August 1945, and the Charter issued pursuant thereto ... the Control Council enaCts
as follows:
Article 1
The Moscow Declaration... and the London Agreement ... are made integral
parts of this law...".
For Control Council Proclamation No. 1 see sbid., p. 859.
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tribunal competent to try the alleged German war criminals
could have been established at the outset.
The French prosecution added few new thoughts to the pre-
viously mentioned ideas, except that it reiterated the validity
of a doctrine which, it appears, had its origin with an eminent
French writer who tried in 1918, to justify legally the then pro-
posed trial of Germans accused of having resorted to aggressive
war. 6  This doctrine it may be observed, was simply applied
to the Briand-Kellogg Pact which intended to deprive its signa-
tories of the right to have recourse to war "for the solution of
international controversies " or as an ".instrument of national
policy." Hence, it was asserted by the French prosecution that
since Germany crassly violated the Pact of Paris of which it
was a signatory, thus waging an illegal war, all acts committed
during this war cease, ipso facto, to have the juridical character
of legitimate acts of warfare. They became "purely and simply
common law crimes." 3 7  The opinion, then, was advanced that
since recourse to war implies "preparation and decision," those
who "knowingly took recourse to it, though they had power of
choosing a different path * * * must, indeed, be considered the
direct instigators of the acts qualified as crimes."38 This reno-"
vated doctrine was restored to vigor and life by the French
prosecution. It was their difficult task to defend the interna-
tional validity of the provisions of the Tribunal's Charter for
the writing of which it had, indeed, assumed little responsibility.
The doctrine, it ought to be emphasized, does not constitute a
valid rule of international law; it has never been supported by
the practice of states.39
An interesting sidelight illustrating, perhaps, the doubts as
to the validity of the above doctrine, may be found in the dec-
laration of the French prosecution: "the statute of 8th August
[i.e., the London Agreement and the Charter of the Tribunal]
only established a jurisdiction to judge what was already an
international crime, not only before the conscience of humanity,
but also according to International Law, even before the Tri-
3 GLouis Renault, "De 1'application du droit p~nal aux faits de guerre," in
Rdmue de droit international public, vol. 25 (1918), pp. 5-29, where the writer ad-
vances the doctrine that acts of warfare, although criminal in their character are not
punishable under international law only if the war itself during which these acts
are committed is not waged in violation of international law.
37 Franois de Menthon, Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic, in Opening
Speeches, op. cit., p. 104.
38 Opening Speeches, op. cit., p. 105. See also Proceedings, op. cit., Part 4, p. 351.
39 Hans Kelsen, Peace throujh law, Chapel Hill, 1944, p. 94, where this promi-
nent author, after a careful legal analysis of Renault's original opinion considers
this doctrine as '"untenable ".
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bunal was established. '' 40  Quite consistently, therefore, the
question was asked: if it is not contested that a crime has really
been committed, is it possible to contest the competence of the
International Tribunal to judge it? It is exactly at this point that
the Chief Prosecutor of the French Republic saw himself con-
strained to expose the ex*isting rule of international law, appli-
cable to this aspect of the case. "International responsibility,"
he stated, "normally involves the collective State as such, with-
out in principle exposing the individuals who have been the
perpetrators of an illegal act. It is within the framework of
the State, with which an international responsibility rests, that,
as a general rule,41 the conduct of the men who are responsible
for this violation of International Law may be appraised." 4 2
If the legal responsibility for the violation of the Briand-Kellogg
Pact is collective in character, and if it must be imputed to the
German state, it would seem inconsistent to maintain that illegal
warfare is the condition of individual criminal sanctions under
existing general international law. An illegal act, to be sure,
is not necessarily a crine. - But even if the legally hazardous
theory is upheld that the violation of the Pact of Paris and of
other treaties constitutes an international crime, it still would
be necessary to maintain that such violations are only imputable
to the state on whose behalf they were committed; hence, the
sanctions must be directed against the injuring state. It is
precisely in conformance with this rule that the declaration of
war by the Allies against Germany can be legally justified since-
war is the sanction par excellence which may be attached to such
violations.
The International Military Tribunal, in its discussion of the
law of the Charter, relied primarily on the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
The solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy involves, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the proposition
that "such a war is illegal in international law; and that those
who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible
consequences, are committing a crime in so doing."' 43  The
Court rejected the objections of counsel for the Defense that
the Pact of Paris does not permit construing its violation as a
crime. The Court referred to the practice of military tri-
bunals which, for many years past "have tried and punished
40 Opening Speeches, op. cit., p. 105.
41 The qualification in the above-cited statement obviously refers merely to a few,
specific war crimes in the restricted sense of this term, such as war treason and
espionage. The captor state may punish individuals with death for the commission
of these acts, even if the latter constitute so-called acts of state.
42 Opening Speeches, op. cit., p. 105.
43 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., p. 50.
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individuals guilty of violating the rules of land warfare" laid
down in the Hague Convention of 1907, although the latter "no-
where designates such practices as criminal." 44 The Tribunal,
therefore, deduced that "those who wage aggressive war are
doing that which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment
than a breach of one of the rules of the Hague Convention." 45
De lege ferenda, the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal, according to which recourse to illegal war constitutes
the commission of a crime for which its perpetrators are indi-
vidually responsible, is of far-reaching importance. De lege
lata, the judgment does not correspond with the rules of general
international law. The Hague Convention of 1907, it is to be
observed, was but declaratory of customary international law.
Furthermore, this Convention was implemented by means of
national legislation, especially in the form of the various mili-
tary codes still in existence. However, it would seem untenable
to assert that the practice or the municipal laws of the signa-
tories to the Pact of Paris, rendered recourse to "aggressive
war"' 46 an individual criminal offense. The Pact of Paris, it
is important to note, contains no provision referring to aggres-
sive war. In fact, a suggestion made by Ml. Briand to insert
in the wording of the Pact the term, "renunciation of wars of
aggression," was rejected by Secretary of State Kellogg.47 Nor
is it possible to find in the Pact any stipulation referring to
individual criminal responsibility, or, as a matter of fact, to any
sanction. The meaning of the provision contained in the Pre-
amble of the Pact, that "any signatory Power which shall here-
after seek to promote its national interests by resort to war
should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty," apart
from the fact that the provision does not constitute a legally
binding obligation, does not refer to criminal sanctions against
individuals. It was carefully interpreted during the discussions
of the International Law Association at its meeting in Budapest
in September, 1934. There, agreement prevailed that the Signa-
tories of the Pact considered this clause as applying to a modi-
fication of the rights and duties of neutrals in favor of the
injured state, and to the detriment of the state resorting to war
in violation of the Pact.48 There is hardly any doubt that this
was the generally accepted interpretation of the Pact. It is,
44 Ibid., p. 50.
45 Ibid., pp. 50-51
46 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., p. 50.
47 G. A. Finch, op. cit., p. 10.
48 International Law Association, 88th Report (1934), p. 66. See also H. Lauter-
pacht, " I The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of Interpretation," in Trans-
actions of the Grotius Society, vol. 20 (1935), pp. 178-202.
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for example, exactly on the basis of this interpretation that the
U. S. Government justified the modification of its traditional
policy of neutrality early in 1941. "Secretary of State Hull
and Secretary of War Stimson maintained that, as the neu-
trality of the United States was the most vital benefit to the
violators of the Pact, the benefit should be denied to them in ac-
cordance with the Pact."' 49 And it is in accordance with this
interpretation that the United States abandoned its traditional
policy of neutrality when enacting the Lend-Lease Act on March11, 1941.
Even more difficult to square with the rules of existing inter-
national law is the opinion expressed in the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal according to which the "inter-
national history" preceding the Pact of Paris supports the
Court's view that the violation of the Pact is a crime.50 In evi-
dence of this international history preceding the conclusion of
the Pact of Paris, the Court cited the draft of a Treaty of Mutual
Assistance sponsored in 1923 by the League of Nations. It
stipulates, in Article 1, "that aggressive war is an international
crime." The Preamble to the Geneva Protocol of 1924 which
after "recognizing the solidarity of the members of the inter-
national community," declared that "a war of aggression con-
stitutes a violation of this solidarity, and is an international
crime." The meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations
on September 24, 1927, unanimously adopted a declaration con-
cerning wars of aggression. The Preamble to this declaration
reads as follows:
"The Assembly: Recognizing the solidarity which unites the
community of nations;
Being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of general
peace;
Being convinced that a war of aggression can never serve as
a means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence
an international crime * * "';
Finally the Court cited the unanimous resolution on February
18, 1928, at the sixth (Havana) Pan-American Conference, which
declared that "a war of aggression constitutes an international
crime against the human species."15 1 These glittering declara-
tions of good intentions and the recurring emphasis on the, un-
fortunately not existent solidarity uniting the community of
nations, are very impressive. However, it would seem legally
49 G. A. Finch, op. cit., p. 10.
50 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
51 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit. pp. 51-52
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untenable to accept draft-treaties, protocols, recommendations
and resolutions which never became legally binding and which
were continuously violated, as evidence that the Pact of Paris
is declaratory of an already existing principle of international
law, according to which "resort to a war of aggression is not
merely illegal, but criminal." The facts, it appears, rather
prove that the existing treaties of non-aggression, including the
Briand-Kellogg Pact as well as the various declarations and
resolutions, were continuously, and flagrantly, violated. "Thus
it happened," declares the former Secretary of State, Mr. Henry
L. Stimson-whose interpretation of the Pact is quoted by the
International Military Tribunal in support of the latter's judg-
ment," 52 that in the ten years which began with the invasion of
Manchuria, the principles of the Kellogg Pact were steadily
under attack, and only as the danger came slowly home to each
of them individually, did the peace-loving nations take action
against aggression. "53
In view of the importance attached, especially in some Amer-
ican circles, to the maxims nulla poena sine lege, nulla poena sine
crimine, nullum crimen sine poena legali, and to the ex post facto
principle which is closely related to this doctrine in its effects,
the Allied Prosecution, as well as the Tribunal, found it neces-
sary to counter in greater detail the objections raised by Counsel
for the Defense, with the above doctrines. The gist of these
objections, it appears, may be summarized as follows: even
if one accepts without qualifications the theory that resort to
war in violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and other treaties
is illegal; and even if one were prepared to admit that illegal
and criminal are terms with substantively the same meaning;
one has still to concede that, prior to the creation of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal, no law existed providing for indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for the commission of the acts
enumerated in the Charter as "Crimes against Peace." The
main effort of the prosecuting Powers to meet this challenge
with legal arguments was made at the close of the case against
the individual defendants by the Chief Prosecutor for the
United Kingdom.54 Relying greatly, it appears, on the opinion
of an American criminologist 55 the Allied Prosecution declared
that "the only innovation which this Charter has introduced is
52 Ibid., p. 50.
53 Henry L. Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law," in Foreign
Affairs, vol. 25 (January, 1947), p. 182.
54 See for instance Sir Hartley Shawcross, in Closing Speeches, op. cit., pp. 57-59.
55 Sheldon Glueck, War Criminals, their prosecution and punishment, A. A. Knopf,
New York, 1944, and by the same author: The Niuremberg trial and aggressive war,
A. A. Knopf, New York, 1946.
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to provide machinery, long over-due, to carry out the existing
law; and there is no substance in the complaint that the Charter
is a iece of post facto legislation, either in declaring wars of
aggression to be criminal, or in assuming that the State is not
immune from criminal responsibility.' '5
As regards the assertion that the creation of individual crim-
inal responsibility for the commission of "Crimes against
Peace" is undoubtedly a retroactive act, the prosecution re-
ferred to cases of piracy, breach of blockade, or espionage in
order to prove that the individual "can be made responsible
under International Law.'' 5 Furthermore, the prosecution
pointed to Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution which pro-
vided that the generally recognized rules of international law
are an integral part of German Federal Law. The effect of this
constitutional provision, it was therefore deduced, can be only
that the rules of international law are binding upon individuals.
It would seem that the analogy with regard to acts for which
general international law has established direct individual re-
sponsibility, is ill chosen since it is legally untenable to assert
that this analogy applies to "Crimes against Peace." Nor is it
of legal value to invoke the Weimar Constitution in this respect,
since individual criminal responsibility for illegal resort to war
is, beyond any doubt, no generally recognized rule of inter-
national law. Germany, at least, never recognized.such a rule;
hence it is impossible to consider it as "generally" accepted.
It is, therefore incorrect, if not misleading, to interpret Article
4 of the Weimar Constitution as establishing individual crim-
inal responsibility for the commission of "Crimes against
Peace." 58
A far more convincing rejection of the arguments raised by
the Defense in this matter may be found in the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal which, in essence, refers
to the basically moral concept of justice underlying both the
ex-post facto principle and the doctrine nulla poena sine lege.
"Occupying the positions they did in the government of Ger-
56 Sir Hartley Shaweross, in Closing Speeches, op. cit., p. 57.
57 Ibid., p. 58.
58 According to Article 59 of the Weimar Constitution.the Reichstag had the power
of impeaching the Reich President, the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Ministers
before the Staatsgerichtshof for having violated the law. This provision, however,
ceased to be valid after the Nazi r6gime had been established. Hence, while Ger-
many's alleged resort to illegal war may be considered as a violation of German law
even after the accession to power by the Nazi r6gime, no sanction was provided
constituting the individual responsibility of the members of government guilty of
such violation. For an excellent analysis of the ex post facto rule see Hans Kelsen,
"The rule against ex post facto laws and the prosecution of the Axis war criminals",
in The Judge Advocate JournaZ, vol. 2 (Fall-Winter 1945), pp. 8-12 and p. 46.
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many," so declared the Court, "the defendants, or at least
some of them must have known of the treaties signed by Ger-
many, outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of inter-
national disputes. * * * To assert that it is unjust to punish
those who, in defiance of treaties and assurances, have attacked
neighboring states without warning is obviously untrue; for in
such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing
wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would
be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished. * * * On
this view of the case alone, it would appear that the maxim has
no application to the present facts." '59 It might, perhaps, be
added that neither one of the above-mentioned municipal law
principles constitutes a rule of positive international law, since
it would be impossible, indeed, to prove that these doctrines are
expressive of a general practice accepted as law, or that they
represent the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. Quite apart from Article 2 of the German Criminal
Code, as amended on June 28, 1935 (R. G. B. No. I, 839), the
Criminal Codes of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Re-
public of 1922 and 1926, for example, do not recognize the rule
against ex post facto legislation. Article 58 (13) of the Code
of 1926 expressly provides punishments for "any act or active
struggle against the working class or the revolutionary move-
ment of which any person was guilty while in a responsible or
secret post (i.e. agent) under the Czarist regime, or with any
counter-revolutionary government during the period of the civil
war;" that is to say, for acts which were performed long before
the code came into force and were, at that time, no crime at all.
The youthful notion that the ex post facto rule, since it has been
incorporated into the United States Constituion, is a generally
accepted principle of law certainly is not supported by these
examples. The sincere objections to the Nuremberg Trial raised
on account of the ex post facto rule, particularly in the United
States, therefore, are legally without basis; they are morally
unfounded since, as stated by a leading American authority:
"the infliction of an evil which, if not carried out * * * as a re-
action against a wrong, is a wrong itself. The non-application
of the rule against ex post facto laws is a just sanction inflicted
upon those who have violated this rule and hence have forfeited
the privilege to be protected by it."60
Far more serious are the implications for the future con-
59 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., p. 49.
60 Hans Kelsen, "The rule against ex post facto laws and the prosecution of the
Axis war criminals," op. cit., p. 46.
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tained in the argument, ably presented by the Defense, that,
according to international law, every state may resort to war
in self-defense, and that international law accords every state
the right to decide for itself whether such a war is waged in
self-defense. 1 It does not seem that much attention was given
to this point in the judgment of the International Military Tri-
bunal. The Allied Prosecution, however, answered this question
carefully by admitting the validity of this principle but by
pointing out that it does not apply to the facts of the case before
the International Military Tribunal.6 2 The assertion that Ger-
many acted in self-defense against the threat of Communism
was rejected as absurd by the prosecution. As far as the gen-
eral application of the principle in question is concerned the
prosecution pointed out that the right of self-defense, particu-
larly with regard to the reservations made with it in the Pact
of Paris, "does not impair the capacity of a Treaty to create
legal obligations against war. "63 The right of self-defense,
quite to the contrary, means that a state "in the first instance"
has the right to decide whether there is danger in delay and
whether immediate action to defend itself is imparative. But,
so continues the argument of the prosecution, the state "acts
at its peril" since the state is "answerable if it abuses its discre-
tion, if it transforms 'self-defense' into an instrument of con-
quest and lawlessness ""* *" '- In the absence of any inter-
national agency or court with compulsory jurisdiction compe-
tent to decide whether the right of self-defense may be in-
voked, the interpretation advanced by the Allied prosecution,
in fact, amounts to the admission that it is the right of the victor
to decide whether or not the vanquished resorted to war in self-
defense; or can anyone expect that the vanquished would be per-
mitted to sit in judgment over the victor? To be sure, this
question, as far as the future is concerned, does not lose in
actual value by referring, as Was done by the prosecution, to
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 5 This Article,
it will be noted, permits the use of the "inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense" only "if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations * * *." How-
ever, the provision qualifying the right of resort to force in
self-defense, does not change the fact that, in the final analysis,
only the vanquished is "answerable" to the victor for the abuse
61 See for instance Professor Jahrreiss as quoted in Closing Speeches, op. cit., p. 23.
62 Ibid., p. 23.
63 Ibid., p. 56.




of this "natural right." This is so because the original deci-
sion under the Charter of the United Nations, as to whether or
not such an armed attack las occurred, rests with the state in-
voking the right of self-defense, and also because effective re-
view of this original decision is impossible in all those cases
where action of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security is blocked by the use of the so-
called veto power. Hence, the somewhat embarassing conclu-
sion that.final judgment with regard to the "just" use of the
"inherent right of individual or collective self defense" will,
for all practical purposes, be exercised by the victor, is sup-
ported also by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter.
It goes beyond the scope of this analysis to discuss the legal
merits and political implications of certain more technical and
specialized problems raised very eloquently by counsel for the
defence. The Allied prosecution, to be sure, could simply have
referred to the constitutional law of the Charter when rejecting
pleas made under the act of state theory or the doctrine re-
spondeat superior.66 It is to the merit of the Allied prosecution
that an attempt was made to prove that such objections are
not founded in prevailing international law.67 The International
Military Tribunal, it is interesting to note, rejected, in its
judgment, the validity of the act of state theory by declaring
that "he who violates the laws of war cannot obtain inmunity
while acting in pursuance of the authority of State if the State
in authorizing action moves outside its competence under inter-
national law." 6 8 As regards the plea of superior orders the
Court opined that an order "to kill or torture in violation of
the international law of war has never been recognized as a
defence to such acts of brutality.. .". The true test, it was
emphasized, "is not the existence of the order, but whether
moral choice was in fact possible.'' 69
There is one final observation which arises from the attitude
of the prosecuting nations taken with regard to the future
effects of the Nuremberg Tribunal. It is extremely doubtful
whether the establishment of individual responsibility for new
international delicts such as "Crimes against Peace" can have
66 For an analysis of these questions see F. B. Schick, "War criminals and the
law of the United Nations," in Toronto Law Journal, January 1947. See also the
article of the author in the Aimerican Journal of international Law, vol. 41 (October,
1947), pp. 770-794, entitled "The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of
the Future. "
67 See for instance Closing Speeches, op. cit., pp. 58, 137-138, 140, 151-152.
68 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., p. 53. As stated in the foregoing this opinion
does not reflect a rule of positive international law.
69 Opinion and Judgment, op. cit., p. 54.
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any deterrent effects on those who actually are in a position
to decide upon the resort to illegal war. Interests of a political
nature and the expectance of victory will certainly play a far
more decisive role in the calculations of these persons than the
remote possibility of having to answer for their acts before an
international court. Assuming, however, that these political
leaders would, when deciding' to go to war, consider the conse-
quences of possible defeat, it does not follow that even the threat
of capital punishment could change or even influence their
decisions. It is well known that the death penalty has not pre-
vented individuals from committing murder; nor has it re-
strained patriotic soldiers from volunteering to commit acts of
war treason and espionage in spite of the severe sanction
,attached to them, if only by so doing they could hope to help
the cause of their own country. Even more problematical is
the assertion that the London Agreement "is a basic charter
in the international law of the future", that its law as well as
"the judgment such as has been rendered shifts the power of
the-precedent to the support of these rules of law", and that
"no one can hereafter deny or fail to know that the principles
on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives
constitute law-and law with a sanction." ' 70 To begin with, the
stipulations of the London Agreement and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal do not apply to nationals of the
prosecuting Powers. The Charter, in its very first Article,
declares that only the "major war criminals of the European
Axis" fall under its provisions. Moreover, no court exists com-
petent to administer the law of the Charter to nationals of the
victorious Powers. It is theoretically quite possible to assume
that such a court could be created in the future by international
treaty. In this instance, the law of the Charter and the judg-
ment of the International Military Tribunal could not be- con-
sidered as binding in the sense of a legal precedent upon the
signatories of such a future treaty, since the latter would have
to define anew the law binding upon the court. One may, of
course, hope that all, or most of the victorious Powers as well
as other nations will enact municipal laws giving effect to the
principal provisions of the defunct Charter of the International
Military Tribunal. Hope, to be sure, is always part of youthful
inspiration. In this certainly remote case it might be possible to
show that the Charter was used as a pattern for such national
70 Justice Robert H. Jackson, in "Prosecution of major Nazi war criminals, Final
report to the President from Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson," in The
Department of State Bulletin, vol. XV (October 27, 1946), p. 774.
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legislation; given these circumstances it would be legally correct
to maintain, after sufficient time has elapsed, that these in
effect identical municipal laws are evidence of the existence of
an international custom. In the meantime it is well to observe
that the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the
International Court of Justice contain no provisions whatso-
ever which by any possible stretch of imagination would permit
the interpretation that the victorious nations and their asso-
ciates have accepted the principle of individual criminal re-
sponsibility for the violation of international obligations, and
especially for resort to unauthorized war. In fact, even the
idea of collective enforcement measures on behalf of the United
Nations, as presented in Chapter VII of the United Nation's
Charter, still awaits its implementation under Article 43 of this
Chapter. Even then it will be impossible to apply these col-
lective sanctions 71 as provided for in Articles 41, 42 and 45 to
permanent Members of the Security Council which, except for
China, are identical with the prosecuting powers of Nuremberg.
It would seem even more difficult to speak under these circum-
stances of "the historic precedent set at Nurnberg. ..,72 One
might consider it morally imperative, however, that the United
Nations, and especially the prosecuting powers, implement the
solemn promises made at Nuremberg. Indeed, the serious warn-
ing expressed by the Chief Prosecutor for the United States
should be heeded that "Ino one of the prosecuting nations can
long depart from these standards in its own practice without
inviting the condemnation and contempt of civilization." 73 To
put this admonition differently, the time has come to affirm the
main principles of the Nuremberg Charter by incorporating
them into the law of the United Nations or, if this procedure
should prove impossible at present, to propose measures
through the medium of the General Assembly to be taken by
each Member of the United Nations in order to give effect to
the principles proclaimed at Nuremberg. To be sure, a first step
in this direction was taken by the General Assembly which, by
a fesolution of December 11, 1946 directed its Committee on the
Progressive Development of International Law "to treat as a
matter of primary importance plans for the formulation, in the
context of a general codification of offenses against the peace
71 For an analysis see F. B. Schick, "The Nuremberg Trial and the International
Law of the Future," op. cit., pp. 793-794.
72 "Reply of President Truman to Justice Jackson" in The Department of State
Bulletin", vol. XV (October 27, 1946), p. 776.
73 Robert H. Jackson, Address at the University of Buffalo, in The New York
Times, October 5, 1946, p. 4.
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and security of mankind, or of an international criminal code,
of the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal.'"74 This Com-
mittee, in a report published on June 17, 1947 decided, however,
not to undertake the actual formulation of the Nuremberg Prin-
ciples since this would "clearly be a task demanding careful
and prolonged study." The Committee concluded by a majority
"that it was not called upon to discuss the substantive provi-
sions of the Nuremberg Principles, and that such a discussion
would be better entrusted to the International Law Commis-
sion . . .' It may finally be noted that the Representatives
for Egypt, Poland, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia rejected a majority decision
of the same Committee recommending that the iiiiplementation
of the principles of the Nuremberg Trial and its judgment "may
render desirable the existence of an international judicial au-
thority to exercise jurisdiction over such crimes."176 At pres-
ent, it would seem that only the French government has taken
preliminary positive steps by submitting, on May 15, 1947 a
memorandum concerning a draft proposal for the establishment
of an international court of criminal jurisdiction, and on M[ay
27, 1947 a memorandum concerning draft texts relating to the
Principles of the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg
Tribunal.77
74 United Nations Journal No. 58 (Supplement A), p. 470.
75 Doe. A/AC.10/52, 17 June 1947.
76 Ibi.
77 Doe. A/AC.10/34.
